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Simulation and Understanding Other Minds 
Sherri Roush, King’s College London 
Abstract: 
There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mind-reading, behavior-reading, 
and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how 
each method is implemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question what it 
is about the products of these methods that makes them count as knowledge or understanding. This 
question has become especially salient recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can 
bring understanding of another’s action despite involving no higher-order processing, whereas most 
epistemologists writing about understanding think that it requires reflective access to one’s grounds, 
which is closer to the intuitions of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what 
it is that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of the context of 
cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1) that theoretical mind-reading and 
simulation bring understanding in virtue of the same epistemic feature, 2) why the kind of motor 
representation without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient for action 
understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be paid to the potential disadvantages 
of a simulative method of knowing. Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring 
vulnerability, wear and tear on one’s personal equipment, and unintended mimicry. 
 
 
Introduction 
The view that we know the beliefs, desires, intentions, and feelings of other people by, in some 
sense, simulating or replicating them has been around for a long time, but in cognitive science in the 
1980s it began to be developed more fully as a rival to the view that we know each other’s mental 
states by interpreting them using concepts and theories. There are many versions of this simulation 
view of our mindreading capacities, but broadly speaking on such a view we know each other’s 
minds primarily by running through a similar process in our own mental equipment to what is going 
on in theirs, and seeing what mental states and behavior we ourselves would have. On a theoretical 
mind-reading view, we know each other’s minds primarily by having beliefs about others’ behavior 
and mental states to which we apply a theory of mind and reason to conclusions about other mental 
states and behavior.1 It is clear that we are capable of theoretical mind-reading, but the plausibility 
of our at least sometimes also simulating was secured with the discovery of mirror neurons at the 
end of the 20th century. This phenomenon gives concrete evidence that in some cases we actually do 
acquire a kind of replica of the other person’s mental states in our own mental states, and that we 
do this not only in imagination but at the level of our brains, in body-coded patterns of firings of the 
same neurons that fire when we do or feel the thing we witness the other doing, a phenomenon 
called embodied simulation. (Gallese and Goldman 1998, Gallese, Keysers, and Rizzolati 2004, 
Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011, Goldman 2012, Calise 2013)  
This firing of motor neurons is the simulative response that stands in the most extreme contrast to a 
theoretical response, since motor neurons definitely do not carry out reflection and their firings are 
                                                             
1 Note that to avoid clumsy terminology in what follows I am using the term “mindreading” generally, for 
understanding another’s mind regardless of method, and the qualifier “theoretical” when referring to that 
particular method. 
not believings or other kinds of propositional attitudes using concepts. This leads to the question just 
how much understanding can be achieved through them alone. If we get something epistemic out of 
matching that is this devoid of beliefs then simulation is powerful indeed, but how could it be so? 
Mirror neurons display three properties that I take to be required for simulation in this context. (Cf. 
Goldman 2006) One is that a simulation executes a process, another that the process is dynamically 
isomorphic to the process undergone by the person being evaluated, hereafter the actor, and third 
that the process is a re-deployment of the mechanism that serves the mind-reader when she herself 
behaves along the dimensions relevant to the behavior of the actor. I will argue that the first two 
features, which are shared by theoretical mindreading, are what makes either method able to 
deliver understanding. The qualitative nature of the dynamically isomorphic states the understander 
possesses – whether beliefs or primitive firings – and whether the process is a redeployment or not 
are what I take to distinguish simulation from theory. These features are not per se relevant to 
whether or how much understanding is delivered, but they are pragmatically relevant to how 
efficiently and accurately understanding is achieved in a given case, and with how much risk to the 
mind-reader. As I will explain below, the simulator may think less and respond faster with the same 
accuracy in some kinds of cases, but he also has “skin in the game” and this can carry costs that the 
theorizer avoids. 
 
Social Cognition as Knowledge 
Many think of simulation as a process, one that takes “pretend” behavior and mental states as input 
and by grinding these inputs through a person’s own belief-desire mill, produces “pretend” mental 
states and behavior as output, output that is then projected onto the mind one is trying to 
understand. (Goldman 2006) As a process, simulation lends itself well to the application of Alvin 
Goldman’s epistemological theory of justified belief as a belief that resulted from a reliable process, 
that is, a process that produces true beliefs most of the time. Simulation can be a way of gaining 
such justified beliefs about other minds on the assumption that human beings’ belief-desire mills are 
similar to each other, despite wide variation in the beliefs and desires themselves. If our mills are 
similar enough, and I put relevantly similar beliefs, desires, and intentions as input into my mill as 
are input in yours, then I will usually come up with accurate beliefs about your beliefs, desires, 
intentions and behavior. If this process does get it right most of the time then that means, on 
Goldman’s view, that each one of its verdicts is a justified belief. 
Reasoning with a theory, and inferring from past to future behavior in more primitive ways by 
association, are also processes, and Goldman’s view of justified belief applies in the same way to 
them. Insofar as the theoretical assumptions we make about other minds are true, and we 
accurately observe other minds’ behavior, infer their mental states from it, and appropriately apply 
the theoretical assumptions to it, the beliefs that we get about their future mental states and 
behavior will also be accurate. That in this way we get it right most of the time means that every 
occasion of it yields a justified belief. Goldman’s concept of justified belief applies in a similar way to 
less intellectually developed or consciously available processes of predicting behavior on the basis of 
other behavior. It does not matter how unsophisticated the process might be or how inaccessible its 
workings might be to the subject herself, as long as it gives her true beliefs most of the time. 
Justified belief is the main ingredient of knowledge on Goldman’s view2 so despite the differences in 
                                                             
2 Knowledge is defined by adding to Goldman’s view of justified belief a requirement that the belief actually be 
true, and a clause that rules out troublesome Gettier cases. 
the three processes that could be methods of knowing other minds, the methods all would produce 
knowledge of other minds in virtue of the same property: the reliability of the process through 
which those beliefs were formed. 
Many theories of knowledge will apply neatly to simulations and other forms of mind-reading even 
though they do not take the process through which a belief was formed to be the crucial bearer of 
epistemically relevant properties. A more traditional view of justified belief, and thereby knowledge, 
has an internalist requirement that the subject have access to the reasons for his belief, and be able 
to give an account of those reasons, and this is a condition that theorizing about other minds can 
easily achieve. This is because that reasoning is usually imagined to take place via meta-beliefs about 
the other mind and minds in general, and these will usually be accessible to the subject, at least in 
principle.3  
But this traditional view will not count all simulations as giving justified belief. If a simulation is of the 
high-level variety where one uses imagination to stage the play that results in a conclusion about the 
other mind, then one will often be able to give some account of why one believes that conclusion, 
and by that fact have a justified belief. However embodied simulation does not use imagination4 – 
the replicas of the other mind’s states are coded more primitively in the firings of mirror neurons – 
and a subject whose conclusion about the other person has been affected by these neurons may not 
be able to give informative reasons why he has the conclusion he has. If we think that embodied 
simulation can give a subject beliefs with the same level of justification as beliefs reasoned from a 
good theory can have, then Goldman’s view of justified belief, which is externalist since it does not 
require the subject to be able to call up the reasons for his belief, has an advantage over the 
traditional view of justified belief and knowledge. 
There are other externalist theories of knowledge that can be applied easily to our mentalizing 
beliefs about other people. My own favorite view takes the properties relevant to the epistemic 
achievement of knowledge to be two tracking requirements. (Roush 2005) The first is the variation 
or sensitivity condition, which says that in order for the subject to know proposition p her 
dispositions must be such that the probability she does not believe p given that p is false is high (or, 
equivalently, the probability that she believes it given that it is false is low): 
P(-b(p)/-p) > .95 variation (sensitivity) condition 
The second is the adherence condition, which says that the probability she believes p given that p is 
true is high: 
P(b(p)/p) > .95  adherence 
These conditional probabilities are modal properties. In order for the subject to satisfy them in a 
particular case of belief she must have dispositions that would make her have the same belief or no-
belief responses to the truth and falsity of p in a variety of non-actual situations.5 On this picture 
knowledge of p is a matter of being disposed to have one’s beliefs states follow p through changes in 
circumstances and p’s truth value. 
                                                             
3 An exception to this is described in footnote 13, but there too the reasoning would be consciously accessible 
to the subject. 
4 This is so even if higher-level interpretation is required in order for those mirroring simulations to be 
delivered selectively depending on goals. (See Csira 2013, Jacob 2013 )  
5 How to define which situations among all possible situations are the ones the subject is responsible for is a 
long-standing question which I answer via further probabilistic conditions (Roush 2005, Ch. 3). 
The application of the tracking conditions to mentalizing about other minds is straightforward. If a 
subject has dispositions of using a theory and observations about others’ behavior and states in such 
a way as to avoid false ascriptions of mental state m to others and to tend to make true attributions 
of mental state m, then in any particular case of attributing m she tracks that mental state, and if in 
addition she is actually right in that case then she also knows.6 If her more primitive behavior-
predicting mechanisms track behavior in a similar way, and so yield beliefs about the other that track 
the other, then she knows for similar reasons. The criteria are the same for simulations. If via 
simulation a subject truly believes that another has mental state m and the subject’s simulative 
powers and tendencies are such that were the mental state not there in the other mind she 
wouldn’t believe it was, and were that to be the mental state in a range of other situations she 
would also believe it was7, then that belief about the other is knowledge. Tracking can also be 
defined for states more primitive than belief, by substituting some other state in for b(p) in the 
equations. A person will track where the actor’s hand is if her mirror neurons fire selectively, that is, 
fire in a certain pattern when the hand is in a given state, and do not fire when it is not in that state. 
Whether the subject uses a theory of mind, simulation, high-level or low-level, or primitive behavior-
predicting heuristics, the results will be knowledge or knowledge-like, if they are, in virtue of the 
same properties: fulfillment of the tracking conditions. 
However we come to a belief, in order for it to count as knowledge it must have a robustness by its 
accuracy being more than an accident. Whereas that is guaranteed in Goldman’s view by the 
requirement that your process get it right most of the time, and in an internalist justified-belief view 
by the fact that you can give the reasons for your belief, in tracking it is insured by your disposition 
to get a belief state about p that is appropriately responsive to p’s truth value in all probable non-
actual circumstances.8  
On this tracking view it does not matter whether simulation or theorizing is the process one uses 
because what method or process you use to come to your beliefs does not matter at all per se to 
whether a belief counts as knowledge. It matters only insofar as the method and your tendency to 
use that method affect your tendency to come to an appropriate belief state. Similar to Goldman’s 
view the tracking view is also externalist: it does not matter whether under questioning you could 
come up with any reason at all for your belief. What matters here is whether your belief actually 
stands in a tracking relation to the truth. Thus according to the tracking view embodied simulation is 
at no epistemic disadvantage if one who uses it is unable to give an account of how he came to his 
conclusion about the other person. The tracking view is consistent with the plain fact that the 
process or method used matters pragmatically insofar as given the creatures we are some methods 
will be available and effective while others will not. For example, if there is no fairy godmother in our 
world then we might need to use perception, or, due to the limits of our automatic inferences in 
complex cases we might need to use explicit reasoning, which we would also be able to report on 
                                                             
6 The tracking conditions are not strictly closed under known implication, leading to the consequence that the 
level of tracking can fall off with each inference, and eventually have the level of tracking in one’s conclusion 
belief fall below the threshold. I address this in Roush (2012), where I show that under natural conditions the 
tracking level falls off gradually with acceptable lower bounds, a property I call “closure enough”. 
7 For ease of exposition I formulate the conditions counterfactually rather than probabilistically in this 
sentence though the distinction is quite important. (Roush 2005, Ch. 3) 
8 Externalist theories of knowledge are weaker than internalist in that they do not require conscious access to 
reasons, but stronger along another dimension. Typical internalist theories do not require for knowledge any 
reliable relation of the subject’s belief to how the world is. The only relation the belief must have to the world 
is being true. 
questioning. But these are contingent facts about the means to knowledge, not relevant, on the 
tracking view, to the question what it is to achieve the goal of knowledge. 
These reflections make the simple point that on a variety of views of knowledge behavior-reading, 
simulation, and theoretical mind-reading are capable of delivering knowledge of other minds, and 
though each theory of knowledge sees a different feature as crucial to whether a belief is 
knowledge, for a given theory its key feature applies naturally to all three methods of social 
cognition; the reasons the methods give knowledge when they do are the same within each view. 
The one wrinkle in this neat story is that internalist views of justified belief or knowledge may have 
difficulty finding a way to count the deliverances of embodied simulation as knowledge. However, 
that will depend on the details of the particular epistemological theory and the detailed facts of 
embodied simulation. 
 
Knowledge versus Understanding 
Though the terms “knowledge” and “understanding” are sometimes used synonymously, the word 
“understanding” as applied to persons has warm, fuzzy, and respectful connotations that are prima 
facie not well-captured by the idea of accurate identification and prediction of behavior and mental 
states, even if we add that one must achieve this accuracy robustly. The general concept of 
understanding as distinct from knowledge has received a great deal of attention in recent 
epistemology (e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Elgin 2006, 2009), and several features stand out as consensus 
views among those who theorize about what it is to understand a subject matter. One is that 
understanding requires appreciation of the relations among the facts in that domain, another that 
one who understands must be able to use her beliefs in further inferences about or activities 
concerning the subject matter, still another that understanding is more valuable than and not a 
subspecies of knowledge. These would not be implausible as requirements on what it is to 
understand another person’s action or desire, but notice that none of the views of knowledge above 
explicitly imply that one will have any of these properties with regard to a person whose mental 
state one knows or a proposition that one knows about them. Understanding is a different epistemic 
property from knowledge, and can be expected to be so in application to persons as much as to 
subject matters. 
The only explicit definition of understanding that I know of in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions is my own view based on relevance matching (Roush 2016) which I will use to explore the 
similarities and differences among the methods of mentalizing about other minds. This is a view not 
of what it is to understand a subject matter, which occupies most epistemologists in this area, but 
what it is to understand why p, a proposition, is true, as opposed to merely knowing that it is true. 
The contrast is easily seen by thinking of cases of knowledge got by using mere indicators. I can 
know what the temperature is outside by using a good thermometer, but that would not give me an 
understanding of why the temperature is what it is. For that I would need to appeal to things like 
what season it is, and that a cold front has just come in to my area. A better understanding would 
come from wider and deeper knowledge of the detailed dynamics of snowstorms, world weather 
and climate at the current time, and general meteorology.  
The relevance matching view of understanding takes its cue from the idea that understanding why p 
is true requires an appreciation of the relation of p’s being true or false to other matters being true 
or false. Like the tracking view of knowledge it makes the idea rigorous in terms of a particular kind 
of dispositional covariation of properties of one’s belief in p with properties of the world, expressed 
in conditional probability, and in which the direction of fit has the subject following the world. Unlike 
in tracking, the relevant matters in the world that one’s belief must by definition be well-disposed 
toward include not just p but many other propositions. All understanding that finite human beings 
actually achieve will be partial on this view, but this is not counterintuitive. 
Any proposition, q, has a degree of relevance to p that is, intuitively, the difference that q’s being 
true or false makes to p’s being true or false, and that degree of relevance might of course be none. 
q’s being positively relevant to p can be expressed in probability as follows: 
P(p/q) > P(p/-q) 
This says that, other things equal, p is more likely when q is true than when q is false – q’s being true 
rather than false makes a positive difference to whether p is true – and the further the left hand side 
exceeds the right hand side the more the positive relevance. We can measure how much difference 
it makes by considering the ratio of the two terms, where positive relevance means P(p/q)|P(p/-q) > 
1, and I will take how far this value is greater than 1 to measure the degree of positive relevance.9 If 
q is not relevant to p the greater-than signs are replaced by equals signs. If q is negatively relevant to 
p, then not-q will be positively relevant. 
A distinct question is whether q’s being true or false makes a difference to your believing p. If q’s 
truth makes a positive difference to whether you believe p, that is, to b(p), we can express that 
situation as follows: 
P(b(p)/q) > P(b(p)/-q) 
You are more likely to believe p given that q is true than you are given that q is false. q’s truth value 
is something you rely on in opting to believe or not believe p. This can also be written as the ratio of 
those two terms being greater than 1: 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q) > 1 
and measured by how far it exceeds 1. Again if q is irrelevant to your believing p then these greater-
than signs will be replaced by equals signs, and when q is negatively relevant not-q will be positively 
relevant. 
If you are to appreciate the relations p has to other matters then the relevance that the truth values 
of propositions other than p have to your believing p had better match, to some degree, the 
relevance that they have to p’s being true. I will call it a relevance match for p on q when 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q)  ≈   P(p/q)|P(p/-q) 
the difference that q makes to whether you believe p (the term on the left hand side) is 
approximately the same as the difference that q makes to whether p is the case (the right hand 
side). We have a relevance mismatch for p on q whenever 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q)  ≉   P(p/q)|P(p/-q) 
that is, when q’s truth value makes significantly more of a difference or less of a difference to 
whether you believe p – the left-hand side – than it does to whether p is true – the right-hand side. 
Understanding why p is true then requires that you relevance match for p on an appropriate domain 
                                                             
9 There are other ways of measuring degree of probabilistic relevance. This measure corresponds to the 
likelihood ratio, which I prefer on other grounds (Roush 2005, Ch. 5), and which makes for a clear link between 
this view of understanding and the tracking view of knowledge. 
of q’s. For the case of temperature, reading the thermometer will give you no understanding of why 
the temperature is low if you would believe it is low regardless of whether a cold front is or is not 
coming in and of whether you do or do not live near the equator, since the temperature depends on 
those things. 
Pictorially, the relevance matching conditions require the following kind of relation of your 
dispositions to believe p and p’s relations to other matters: 
 
 
The arrow from ±p to ±b(p) indicates that your belief in p tracks p, where the ± indicates the two 
possibilities for the truth values of the proposition; tracking has you following the world and not the 
other way around, so the arrow is single-sided. The arrows between the qis and your belief in p 
indicate the relevance matching by being isomorphic to the arrows between the qis and p.  
While this picture is good as far as it goes, it does not capture a notion of understanding that goes 
beyond tracking, for perfect tracking – the relation in the diagram between p and b(p) – logically 
implies perfect relevance matching, and vice versa. This is because a perfect indicator does your 
relevance matching for you. A perfect thermometer perfectly follows the temperature, and so 
follows the existence or not of a cold front in precisely the way that that temperature does. In 
perfectly following the thermometer your belief about the temperature follows the cold front in the 
only way you need to do for relevance matching. 
Imperfect relevance matching and imperfect tracking diverge in ways that are important 
pragmatically to how best to go about pursuing either of them (Roush 2016). However they do not 
differ in the right way to make imperfect relevance matching into imperfect understanding, since 
any degree of mere matching of your believing p to the factors in p’s web of relevance is still 
compatible with the matching being secured by something other than yourself. You may do 
imperfect but good relevance matching to the factors relevant to a storm via an imperfect but good 
thermometer. Or you might consult what a good computer simulation programmed by someone 
else concludes about the likely course of a storm, and to be good it must make use of many factors 
relevant to the storm. Your belief about the course of the storm will relevance match to those 
factors because the simulation does, but if you have no clue or sense of how the simulation gets its 
conclusions then this gives you no understanding of why the storm will follow that path.  
This inadequacy of mere relevance matching corresponds to the observation of several authors, 
noted above, that understanding is something that its possessor can use in further inferences or 
activities. Relevance matching is a direct way of expressing the right kind of sensitivity to the factors 
in p’s web of relevance and is part of understanding on my view, but the subject can achieve it 
without being able to take the understanding home with her and leave the computer at work, 
without herself having a capacity to know how to go on or exploit the relevance matching in her 
further endeavors. The additional condition besides relevance matching that is needed for a subject 
to understand why p is true, as I have argued elsewhere (Roush 2016), is that the subject herself 
possess states whose dispositional relations to her belief in p match the dispositional relations that 
the qi’s have to p, a situation that can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
The subject who possesses the network of four states in the right half of the diagram not only has a 
belief-state with regard to p that is dispositionally related to the qi’s in the same ways that p is 
related to those qi’s but also has states si that her believing p or not is dispositionally related to in 
the same ways as p is related to the qi’s.  For example, if p’s truth is positively relevant to q3’s 
falsehood to some degree, then the subject’s belief in p is positively relevant to state s3 being in the 
off mode to a similar degree. And so on for all of the possible permutations. For ease of exposition I 
have represented the possibilities as binaries – true or false, plus or minus, on or off – but naturally 
they could come in degrees. 
The subject in the next figure relevance matches to p on q1, q2, and q3 (omitted for simplicity) as in 
the previous diagram, but this figure displays that having si’s with the property just explained gives 
the subject a dynamical model of the web of relevance around p, because the subject’s si states 
track the qi’s. This is because it follows logically from her states, ±si, relating to her belief state ± b(p) 
in the same way as the ±qi relate to ±p, and her belief b(p) tracking p, that her states si  
 have a minimum level of tracking of the qi respectively.10  
In cases fitting these latest two diagrams, the subject has a set of states that is isomorphic to p and 
its web of relevance, which I call a dynamical mirror model because the replica is not a static image 
but fully dispositional. The si’s do not just happen to coincide at a given time with b(p) in a way that 
mirrors the qi’s relations with p. The covariation of their values, indicated by + or -, with the subject’s 
believing p or not co-varies with the covariation of the qi’s’ values with p’s truth or falsity in all 
relevant possible worlds. Understanding why p is true is not itself a propositional attitude toward p 
but a co-variation of co-variations of states of the world and states of the understander. To 
understand why p is true is to own a dynamical working model of p’s web of relevance, not in one’s 
pocket but somewhere in one’s person.11 Owning that model implies that in any particular actual 
state of the world you very likely actually have the appropriate mirror states, whether that means 
“off” or “on” corresponding to true and false for p and each of the qi. As above with tracking, what it 
might take to bring it about that you have this set of interacting dispositions, or to activate them in a 
particular way, is not relevant to whether the set of dispositions counts as understanding, a point 
that will be important in application to the case of mirror neurons below. 
                                                             
10 This tracking is achieved to a degree bounded from below by the level of matching the si – b(p) 
relations have to the relations between the qi’s and p, and the level of tracking that b(p) does of p, a 
property I call “transitivity enough”. See Roush 2005, Chapter 5. 
11 The force of my phrase “in one’s person” is to include the body and not just the mind, and to require an 
intimate sense of ownership of the states that co-vary with the world, but it is not intended to exclude a priori 
the possibility that the mind extends beyond the skull to include cognitive aids in the environment. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998) I say that a person does not achieve understanding of why the temperature will be high 
merely by consulting a computer simulation’s output prediction that the temperature will be high, if he has no 
knowledge or sense of the dimensions of the model the computer is using. The computer itself may 
understand, since it does possess the dynamical model of the weather. And the computer’s computation can 
be said to be part of the person’s cognitive process for identifying the temperature, and so part of his 
extended mind. However to be hooked up to the variation in the computer’s states that correspond to variable 
dimensions in the world – i.e. to be hooked up to the computer’s understanding – in such a way as to make 
use of it would ipso facto give one a dynamical mirror model inside oneself, meaning that there would be no 
reason to say one’s understanding was located in the mind’s extension rather than inside one’s skull. 
Understanding may be a bit like taking a bath – something you have to do yourself. 
Commented [CK1]: What about extended/distributed 
understanding? Do you really want to rule out that 
possibility? 
I do not require that the states si in one’s model are themselves beliefs or even mental states more 
generally, because, on theoretical and intuitive grounds, I do not think understanding requires these. 
Theoretically, it is evident from the diagrams, I think, that what does the work of giving a subject 
appreciation of the relation of p to other matters is not the qualitative properties of the si, but the 
relations of the si’s to other states of the subject, especially b(p), and the relation of these to the qi’s 
and p. It is appreciation of the relations that other matters have to whether p is true, the relevance 
matching, not the qualitative properties of the states one relevance matches with, that makes it 
count as understanding. It is clear from the definitions that understanding is strictly stronger than 
tracking, and hence more than knowledge. And the fact that understanding resides in the relation of 
one’s dispositional states to a network of other matters means that even when one’s understanding 
is carried by states more primitive than belief, that’s counting as understanding is not due to 
understanding’s having been watered down to predictive success about p. 
Intuitively, we can see why understanding does often involve but does not require beliefs about the 
q by thinking about examples. In a well-worn example from discussion of scientific explanation, we 
improve our understanding of why p, Mr. J has paresis, a distinctive kind of paralysis, when we 
discover that only people with tertiary, untreated syphilis have this condition. This is borne out by 
my picture because the discovery means that our belief or lack of belief that someone has paresis 
now covaries appropriately not only with beliefs about his paralysis symptoms but with belief or lack 
of belief in another factor, the presence of latent untreated syphilis, so this counts as an 
improvement in our understanding of Mr. J’s having the paralysis. This is a case where the 
appreciation of relevance relations is carried by beliefs: that a patient has untreated syphilis, and 
that this is a necessary condition for paresis, are things one acquires beliefs about. Explicit reasoning 
about Mr. J would display one’s understanding. Reasoning from a belief that latent untreated 
syphilis is a necessary condition for paresis to the belief that the patient has latent untreated syphilis 
would exhibit that one has beliefs whose dispositions to be held or not correspond to the logical and 
probabilistic relations that the beliefs’ propositional contents have in the world. In other words, the 
si’s in this case are beliefs in the qi’s; si is b(qi). 
However, the appreciation of relevance relations around p may be carried by states that a person 
does not have reflective access to and that may not have the compositional complexity of belief. We 
have this in cases of expert intuition, for example when, as the story goes, Linus Pauling, on learning 
of the sickled appearance of the blood cells in sickle-cell anemia, immediately declared that this 
must be due to a genetic abnormality in the hemoglobin molecule. It took years of dogged work (by 
Harvey Itano) to discover what the chemical abnormality is that causes the sickling, but it was 
considered worth the investigation because everyone knew that Pauling’s vast experience of 
molecular chemistry gave him understanding – appreciation of the extent of relevance of chemical 
properties to phenomena at a larger scale – that supported the plausibility of his specific 
conjectures. He appreciated relevance relations beyond what he would probably have been able to 
say explicitly at the time. 
Understanding without the ability to report beliefs or give explicit explanations is common in 
science. (Lipton 2009) Visual imagination and a good orrery can give one understanding of the 
retrograde motion of Mercury that one might not be able to give an equivalent verbal account of. 
One can acquire sophisticated understanding of a machine by becoming expert at using it, and this 
manipulational ability stores causal information that one may not be able to articulate in sentences. 
The inarticulateness, which on my model is due to the states si being something more primitive than 
belief, does not prevent understanding from being usable. One who understands Mercury’s motion 
via the orrery would be able in the same way to see what change in its position or motion would iron 
out the retrograde appearance. One who understands the machine via manipulation will know how 
to use it on a new case. Pauling’s understanding gave him hunches about which specific properties 
to check. Understanding is often used to make inferences from some beliefs to others, but it need 
not be carried by beliefs in order to be usable.  
  
Social Cognition and Understanding 
The two main models of the way that we cognize other minds, simulation and theoretical 
mindreading, can both be seen as capable of delivering understanding on this view. Both simulation 
and reasoning are processes, and, speaking abstractly, they are each an activation of a complex of 
dispositions that lies in wait in the understander. In the case of reasoning these are dispositions to 
change one belief in response to changes in another belief. For a very basic example, a good 
reasoner will be disposed to believe p whenever he believes p-and-q, and will disposed to withdraw 
belief in p-and-q when he comes to believe not-q.12 For deductive relations among propositions the 
dispositional relations among his beliefs can mirror those relations in the world without him having 
done empirical investigation. When his beliefs and the dispositional relations among them are 
graded, degree of belief in p being disposed merely to increase degree of belief in q for example, 
those relations among his degrees of belief will mirror the relations among the propositions, such as 
p and q, when he has it right about how the matters of p and q relate in the world. 
Suppose one knows that actor A is wealthy, with much more in resources than he can use himself. In 
conversation with A one forms the belief that A is sympathetic to the plight of B, and one 
encourages A to help B financially. One knows that B is proud, so there is some likelihood he will 
reject the help, but there is a decent chance he will accept it although that would also bring him 
ambivalence and resentment. But you feel sure A will not tell B that you encouraged him because A 
will want to be seen as coming to the idea himself. Thus you think that your encouragement of A will 
increase the chances that he offers help to B, and not be revealed to B, and that in this way you can 
raise the chances of B getting help without B’s resenting you or being embarrassed for it in front of 
you. 
In this case reasoning with a theory of mind gives a plausible model of your cognition of A and B’s 
actions and mental states. You have beliefs about how pride affects acceptance of help and 
inclination to reveal the causes of one’s actions, as well as the mental states of ambivalence and 
resentment and embarrassment, and about the characteristics of A and B in particular in these 
dimensions. These beliefs are premises in your reasoning, and they are also qi in the model of 
understanding. You can understand to some extent why A offers help, if he does, or why B accepts it, 
if he does, because you have beliefs about these qi and their relevance to, their potential to affect, A 
and B’s behavior, and your beliefs about the qi are disposed to change relative to each other and to 
your belief in p, say the proposition that B accepts the offer with ambivalence, in the same way as 
the qis are disposed to change relative to each other and to p. Moreover, you would be able to call 
up at least a sketchy version of these beliefs and their relationships on questioning. Thus, the 
                                                             
12 I myself think of beliefs as dispositions, but any view of belief is consistent with the model I am describing 
because the question what beliefs are can be separated from questions about the dispositions to have one 
belief when one has another. 
dynamical mirroring model of understanding can easily count theoretical mindreading as showing 
understanding.13 
A simulation also activates a dynamical mirror model, a web of dispositional relationships among the 
understander’s mental states, but in this case instead of reasoning, inferring from belief to belief 
about pride and offers of help, one redeploys one’s own affective and motivational machinery. One 
settles in to an offline version of the feeling of pride, for example, pretends that one needs help and 
that someone offers it, and then notes the offline emotional reactions one has. If one’s own 
emotional equipment is relevantly similar to that of the actor, and one has donned the appropriate 
offline beliefs and emotions to mirror his, then the outcome offline emotional reaction will to a good 
extent match the reaction of the actor. Some of the mental states are (offline) beliefs in this case, 
b(qi), such as that one has been offered help, but others are emotional states, mi. We certainly 
possess concepts of pride and embarrassment, but that alone does not imply that we always use 
them as concepts, in beliefs, to come to our conclusions, even when they are relevant. 
 
Action Understanding and Mirror Neurons 
The motor neurons that fire in a monkey when he grasps for an object with his hand also fire when 
he sees someone else’s hand grasping for an object in a similar way, though his mirroring neurons 
are not inducing the same action on his part. Similar phenomena of reuse or redeployment have 
been found in humans, and over a wider range of mental states including not only action intentions 
but sensations and emotions. (Gallese et al. 2004, Keysers and Gazzola 2009, Rizzolatti and Craighero 
2004, Calise 2013) One dominant interpretation of the phenomenon is as a distinctively embodied 
type of simulation, where what makes the firing of motor mirror neurons embodied is that the 
information is formatted in bodily rather than propositional form (Goldman and Vignemont 2009), 
and the possible patterns are constrained by dynamical possibilities of physical movements of the 
body.  
The mirror neurons for, e.g., grasping objects have remarkable selectivity to the goals of the 
witnessed action. In many cases the monkey’s neurons that fire when he witnesses a genuine action 
don’t fire for mimicry, where the observed hand grasps just as if to pick up an apple but the monkey 
knows no apple is there. When the grasping does have a goal, some mirror neurons fire differentially 
for different goals. These can also fire selectively at different stages of the action, at the beginning or 
later, in a way that shows responsiveness to the level of abstraction of the goal. (Calise 2013) Some 
mirror neurons selectively respond to the goal independently of the proximal means used to achieve 
it, whether by hand, foot or mouth, or by a variety of different tools. (Sinigaglia 2013) 
                                                             
13 The fact that theoretical mindreading qualifies as a dynamical mirror model may raise the worry that on my 
view implicit theory use collapses to simulation, since the dynamical mirror model idea has a simulationist feel 
to it. This is ironic since traditionally the worry has been how to define simulation in such a way as to avoid its 
collapse to implicit theory. (e.g., Heal 1994) However, theorizing remains distinct on my view because it uses 
beliefs about the actor in its determination of a conclusion about the actor, rather than the subject’s re-
deploying her own psychological mechanisms. The only case when this distinction would potentially not apply 
is when the subject is trying to determine whether the actor believes p given that the actor believes a set of 
premises q, r, and s. The most efficient way to figure this out would not be manipulating beliefs about the 
beliefs of the actor, but supposing the actor is rational like you and using your own reason to infer from q, r, 
and s to p or not-p. In this case you are re-deploying the equipment that you use to get beliefs like p and not-p, 
and thus count as simulating, but I see nothing counter-intuitive about calling it that, and it does not change 
the distinction present in other cases.  
As more evidence accumulates about how this process works, much controversy surrounds what 
precise role this kind of simulative firing plays in social cognition. In the understanding of motor 
action in particular, the chief question has been what role the mirroring plays in understanding the 
goal of an observed action. Two points of disagreement have been prominent in the discussion. One 
is whether the mirror neuron firings are sufficient for identification of the goal of an action. Some 
think the goal is identified by the mirror neurons via a direct matching (Rizzolatti et al. 2001, Gallese 
2006, Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011), while others think the evidence points to a higher-order process 
that first identifies the goal and tells the mirror neurons to model the observed action as having that 
goal rather than another by firing selectively in the pattern corresponding to that goal (Csibra 2013, 
Jacob 2013). A second prominent point of disagreement is around whether mirror neurons firing in 
the pattern that corresponds to a particular goal counts as ascription of that goal to the actor.  
Both of these issues are taken to be crucial to whether mirror neurons can deliver understanding all 
by themselves. I will take issue with this and argue that which level of processing identifies the 
action as having one goal rather than another, and whether matching firing by itself counts as 
ascription of a goal, do not matter to whether the selective firing of mirror neurons counts as 
understanding why a hand moves as it does. I will argue for these things by showing that according 
to the independently sensible view given above of what it is to understand why p is the case, the 
mere selective firing of mirror neurons counts all by itself as understanding why a hand moves as it 
does. There is also a kind of understanding of why the hand moves as it does that is not captured by 
identifying which goal the actor has or ascribing that goal rather than another to the actor. This is 
appreciation of the goal that it is a goal rather than just a likely future event that makes some 
intermediate events more likely than others, and this kind of understanding the matching mirroring 
delivers directly. Overall, with my definition we can capture what Rizzolatti, Gallese, Sinigaglia, and 
others are seeing in the mirror neuron phenomenon, without running afoul of some of the 
objections that have been made to their particular points. 
Csibra 2013 and Jacob 2013 both argue that direct matching is not sufficient to identify which goal 
an actor has in moving his hand in the observed way. Their point can be illustrated through an 
interpretation of the experiments showing mirror neurons’ selective behavior in response to 
mimicry, not firing when the monkey knows that there is no apple the observed hand can get to. The 
only observed feature that could tell the monkey that the motion is mimicry is the contextual cue of 
presence or absence of an apple, but the mirror neurons cannot themselves be processing that cue 
since all that they can do is fire, or not fire, in a pattern that mirrors the firing of the motor neurons 
making the hand move. Some other process, this view says, must interpret the scene using the 
indicator of the presence or absence of the apple, to tell the mirror neurons whether to fire in the 
grasping way or not. As Csibra says, “… such interpretation [of goals] precedes rather than follows 
from action mirroring” and “goal understanding is not the output but the input of the mirroring 
process”. (Csibra 2013, 450, 446, respectively) 
However this may be, it does not matter to whether the mirroring by itself counts as understanding 
why the hand is moving as it does. This is because the mirroring by itself counts as a dynamical 
mirror model of the action in the sense above, regardless of what further things cause the neurons’ 
activation or the selectivity of their response. Take the p in the diagram below to be the proposition 
that the hand moves thus and so. Some of the qi relevant to whether the hand moves thus and so 
will be propositions concerning the actor’s relevant motor neurons firing. The subject who observes 
the hand moving thus and so also believes that it moves so, that is, b(p), and that belief is related to 
his own corresponding motor neuron firings, si, in the same way as the actor’s hand moving, p, is 
related to the firings of his motor neurons, qi. The subject thus possesses understanding of why p is 
the case, and this is in virtue of actually mirroring and possessing the selective tendencies required 
to fire the relevant neurons when the action is observed, and not when it is not. Rizzolatti et al. put 
it simply in introducing their direct matching hypothesis: “… we understand an action because the 
motor representation of that action is activated in our brain”. 
 
The understanding delivered by the mirror neurons alone is incomplete of course. There will usually 
be other relevant matters that one could come to have states covarying with, e.g., further goals, 
such as eating the apple after picking it up, that this particular mirroring set of neurons is not 
matching to, but to which the subject could relevance match via some sort of state if further clues 
about the action were forthcoming. But all understanding is incomplete and can be filled out further 
by acquiring states that are disposed to covary with more states of the world probabilistically 
relevant to whether p occurs.  
In the case of the moving hand, if there is a process separate from mirror neurons that does the job 
of identifying which goal the actor has, then if that node also corresponds to some state in the actor 
that is related to his moving his hand, such as the intention to do this rather than that, then the 
observer’s having that identifying process gives him greater understanding of why the hand moves 
that way than he had without it. It is just that having that further node is not required in order to 
have understanding at all of why the hand moves as it does. This is so even though on the 
assumption that there is a separate process identifying the goal, that process is causally responsible 
for activating the mirror neurons’ dispositions in one way rather than another. As drawn out above, 
what it might take to bring it about that you have a given set of interacting dispositions, or to 
activate them in a particular way, is not relevant to whether that set of dispositions and activations 
counts as understanding. 
Nor, on my view, is ascription of the goal required for understanding why the hand moves as it does. 
With Jacob 2013 and others, I take ascription in the full-bodied sense that I think is natural, which is 
that “to ascribe an intention to another is to judge or believe that they intend so and so”. (Jacob 
2013, 1139)  So, like these authors, I would not classify the selective firing of mirror neurons as 
ascription of a goal or intention. But both those in the discussion who think mirror neurons’ firing 
does count as ascription (e.g. Gallese) and those who think it does not (e.g., Jacob), are assuming 
that ascription of a goal or intention is needed for understanding of an action, and this is where I 
disagree.  
This is for two reasons. First, to suppose that goal ascription – understood as some further thing 
beyond mirroring itself – is necessary for understanding why a hand moves as it does is to make the 
same mistake as we saw above with assuming that the cause of the activation of the mirroring must 
be included in order to count the mirroring as understanding. Second, to suppose that ascription in 
the full sense involving belief is required for understanding is equivalent in my terms to supposing 
that in order to understand why p is the case the states si that the observer has that correspond to 
and covary with the qi that are relevant to p must be beliefs about the qi – e.g. a belief that the actor 
intends to have the apple – whereas I have argued above that those states need not even be mental.  
We see this with someone whose understanding of a machine, that gives him an ability to use it, is 
carried by muscle memory from his experience of using it. The understanding is carried by the 
covariation of covariations, whatever the qualitative nature of the states that carry it. In the case of 
the hand, there is evidence that the neurons’ mirroring allows the observer to predict or anticipate 
the future steps of the movement, and the outcome, e.g., of acquiring the apple. If those 
anticipations are reliable then the observers’ states are covarying with future states of the hand, and 
even if the states that subserve those anticipations are not beliefs, but information in bodily format, 
the covariation relationships they carry count as part of the understanding. There is no need to call 
the mirroring ascription of a goal in order to count it as understanding. 
There is a further kind of understanding of the action that mirror neurons can achieve all by 
themselves and that it may be difficult for discursive beliefs to capture as richly or efficiently. This is 
understanding not that the goal or intention is this rather than that, but that it is a goal or intention 
at all, as opposed to merely a likely future state of affairs which will make some intermediate states 
of affairs more likely than others. The difference can be illustrated with a clock. We can identify the 
future state towards which a clock is set to run – e.g., it is set to display the same time as a particular 
satellite does 10 minutes from now. But that is not an intention of the clock. We do not understand 
it as an intention and would not simulate the movement of the clock’s second hand with our mirror 
neurons (unless, perhaps, we were pretending the clock was a person, or that we were the clock).  
Mirror neurons allow us to appreciate that the movement of another person’s hand is an action, not 
just an unfolding sequence of states of the world. They do this in virtue of the fact that they are 
redeployments of the mechanism that we use when we act ourselves. It would be difficult to give a 
discursive definition of what it is to act or to intend, as opposed to events just happening, but with 
mirror neurons we do not have to use such a definition. Whatever action and intention are in 
themselves we can recognize them by reference to our own acts; acting is whatever it is I am doing 
when my own motor neurons are firing and causing movement of my hand. Sinigaglia (2013, 60) 
makes a similar point that “. . . [t]he mirror mechanism enables the onlooker to understand the goal 
of the other’s action from the inside as an outcome to which her own action can be directed and not 
just from the outside as something that can happen, as a mere event among others.” It allows one to 
appreciate of a goal or intention that it is a goal or intention. 
 
Efficiency, Vulnerability, and Morality in Social Cognition 
The continual emotion that is felt in the theatre excites us, enervates us, enfeebles us, and makes us less 
able to resist our passions. And the sterile interest taken in virtue serves only to satisfy our vanity without 
obliging us to practice it. 
― Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre 
 
In the justified excitement about mirror neurons and simulation of other minds in general, there is 
too little discussion of the disadvantages of these ways of knowing others’ minds.14 Obviously one 
dimension of trade-off is between efficiency and accuracy. It seems that simulation in general and 
use of mirror neurons in particular can be more efficient than conceptualizing and theorizing in 
simple cases, insofar as it bypasses at least some reasoning processes, thus lightening the 
computational load on the brain and making us able to judge and respond faster. But of course some 
matters are complicated and for those a slower and more laborious reasoning with propositions will 
have enough better accuracy to compensate for the computational cost and loss of speed. So far this 
is merely the well known difference between thinking fast and slow, but understanding by 
redeployment of one’s own system of action-intention, sensation, or emotion introduces a new 
dimension of cost to the observer, the cost of feeling or virtually doing what the other feels or does. 
Redeploying one’s own pain neurons when observing someone else in pain has the immediate cost 
of feeling bad, but the costs can also ramify. One’s natural impulse in response to one’s own pain is 
to take steps to alleviate it, but if it is caused by witnessing someone else’s pain one could achieve 
this not only by alleviating the other’s pain, but also by moving far enough away so as not to observe 
the other anymore; one could help or one could flee, which may cause feelings of guilt later. 
Processing the other’s pain as a fact to have beliefs about rather than re-experiencing it oneself 
would make it possible to respond on the basis of ethical principles and avoid sympathetic pain. If a 
nurse had an impulse to flee when re-experiencing someone else’s pain that would be a reason not 
to simulate on the job (or not to be a nurse), but equally if simulation prompted impulses to help, 
delivery of the help would nevertheless be made less efficient by her wincing at the patient’s pain.  
Feeling another’s pain can also make one vulnerable to exploitation. Suppose that you have a 
tendency to mirror another’s pain when you observe it and a tendency to help rather than flee in 
response to it, and that your decision whether to help is strongly influenced by the intensity of the 
pain or need for help. Then someone who is good at faking the expression of pain or neediness can 
exploit your tendencies and be more likely to gain what they want. If instead of simulating you had 
evaluated the situation entirely in the “pale, detached” medium of belief – representational 
attitudes about propositions – you would observe the visible cues that the person is feeling pain, but 
you would consider various other relevant matters as well, such as whether there are other possible 
motives for the person to display pain signs, and whether you have the spare resources to help. Even 
if the good faker succeeded in getting you to believe they were in pain, these other considerations 
would be weighed alongside, and that attributed pain would also not give you the same degree of 
motivation to help that it would if it were experienced as your own pain. 
Redeployment of one’s own apparatus for feeling and doing when observing others feeling and 
doing may have moral costs as well. Rousseau famously condemned theatre, arguing that an 
audience’s emotional identification with the characters in theatre was morally disastrous. This was, 
roughly, because empathy has a natural role in our innate moral sense motivating us to moral 
action, and the experience of it and its resolution on stage gives an empathizing viewer the false 
sense that moral duty has been discharged. (Banerjee 1977) The intensity of the emotions identified 
with in some drama might also dull one’s sensibilities by wearing them out. Jane Heal puts the point 
nicely when she explains what a simulation is by imagining using one’s heart “offline” to predict 
what will happen to someone else’s heartrate under various physical exertions: “All this sounds 
                                                             
14 An exception is Khalil, who is concerned about how mirroring can lead to contagion, whether the action 
mirrored is good or bad. 
pretty risky. Perhaps it would be better to carry around a spare heart to do the experiments on.” 
(Heal 1994, 134) 
It is easier for an observer to distinguish virtual acting from his taking real action than it is to 
distinguish virtual feeling from real feeling. Yet there is an additional worry about actions, that 
identification with or re-experiencing of another’s intentional actions can make similar action on 
one’s own part more probable, and those actions may not always be good. (Cf. Khalil 2011) This 
could be expected if the experience of dancers is any guide. “Marking” is imaginatively or with only 
faint physical movements putting oneself through the motions of a routine – not just imagining 
someone else do it. It is a ubiquitous practice because without exhausting the muscles it succeeds in 
training them to be more likely to carry out the routine correctly. When mirror motor neurons are 
firing in observation they are either inhibited from or not turned on for leading to action, by the 
firing or not of other neurons, but the regulatory system must be more sophisticated than that if 
virtual dance gets through to affect one’s future actual dance. Learning more about how the 
switching system works will be important for evaluating the cost of simulative ways of knowing. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued on the basis of an independently plausible account of what it is to understand why p is 
the case that theoretical mindreading and simulation achieve understanding in virtue of the same 
feature, which is the ownership of a set of states disposed to vary with the subject’s believing p or 
not in the same way that states of the world relevant to p vary with p’s truth value. I have used this 
concept of understanding to argue that the fact that mirror neurons fire selectively in response to 
observed actions in the same way that they fire when the subject so acts herself is sufficient for the 
subject to have an understanding of why the actor’s hand moves as it does. This understanding is 
achieved whether there is or is not a further process that causes the network of dispositions to be 
activated selectively in a particular case, and whether or not the subject has a further belief state 
that is ascription of a goal, though having those additional nodes in his network would increase or 
improve the subject’s understanding in a clear way. I have further argued that the matching that 
mirror neurons do delivers understanding of an intention that it is an intention in a simple and direct 
way. Finally, I have suggested that the potential costs of social cognition by the method of 
simulation, and the relation of those variables to how the brain works, are worthy of further study. 
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